Op-ed: The world economy is on the move. Too many roads lead away from Trump and to China

The geopolitical tectonic plates are on the move again, and the early tremors are already visible across the global landscape, with significant consequences fortraditionalalliances,globalmarkets, andnational power realignment.

What we are seeing unfoldduringthe first quarter of 2026 increasingly feels like one of thosehistoricalearthquake moments, not because of any single headline associated with President Donald Trump, or single moment like Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s “rupture” in the world order speech at Davos, or any one bilateral meetingor state visit. But taken together, along with the cumulative weight of high-level diplomaticgambitsto Beijing now underway — and many more on the horizon — something structural is happening that requires attention.For markets and policymakers alike, the diplomatic foot traffic tellsa strikingstory: the world is returning to China.

This is not without precedent. In the years following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, global leaders and corporate executives made annual pilgrimages to Beijing,much like those made by eager statesmen and traders during the Qing Dynasty,drawn by the promise of market access, manufacturing skill,productionscaleandscope, and the sheer velocity of Chinese GDP growth at the time. That gravitational pull extended through much of Xi Jinping‘s first five-year term, when China still projected the promise of profits and opportunity more than political constraint and economic contraction.

The momentum shifted dramatically in the years leading up to, and especially after, the pandemic. Supply chain shocks, coercive trade practices,intellectual property theft, datarestrictions,human rights focus,and intensifying geopolitical rivalry hardened Western posture toward Beijing. The language of “de-risking” and “decoupling” migrated from policy circlesin Washingtoninto boardroomsin the U.S. and Europe. Diplomatic traffic did not cease, but it slowed markedly as governments and firms recalibrated exposure to what was increasingly viewed as both geopolitical rival and economic competitor.

What makes the current moment so striking is that the driftnow appears to bereversing, cautiously and without theoverexuberance that defined the post-WTO era. The catalyst for this shift is not a transformation in Chinese governance or economic structure,political systemic change,or how Beijing itself views the West. As difficult as it is for many in Washington to admit, it is a growingperceptionof volatility emanating from Washington itself, an uncomfortable realization for the U.S. national security establishment, and an even harder one for allies to process.

The realignment became particularly visible at Davos, where President Donald Trump openly mocked French President Emmanuel Macron, criticized Canada for insufficient gratitude, and dismissed NATO as a money pit. His incorrect assertion that NATO allies had not served on Afghanistan’s front lines, later walked back, reinforced a broaderperceptionthat times and realities had shifted. But the contempt for Europe did not begin there. It has been building since Vice President JD Vance’s blistering address at last year’s Munich Security Conference, where European partners were publicly castigated. Since then, the tone shift has reverberated across European capitals.

Public opinion data suggests thisparadigm shiftis not being received lightly. In Germany, recent pollingindicatesthat 71 percent of respondents now view the United States as an adversary, while continent-wide surveys show only 16 percent still describing the U.S. as an ally. These figures signal more than frustration; theyrepresenta recalibration of allied riskperception. Risk is one of the most consequential currencies in geopolitics, and Washington has spent years constructing an elaborate risk architecture around China. Now that architectureappears to beturned on its head.

European leaders and the ‘middle power’ imperative

Beijing did not engineer thisparadigm shift, but if it plays its cards right, it is positioned tobenefitfrom it. Over the past year, a steady procession of allied leaders has made its way to China. Each visit has been grounded in national economic self-interest, and while trust in China may be limited, reliance on Washington now feels less certain — more to the point, riskier.

French President Macron’s courtship of Beijing reflects his call for European “strategic autonomy.” Spain’s King Felipe VIset the tone for China-Europeanvisitsheavy in”partnership”symbolism. Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmervisited Beijing andreopened strategicleveldialogues and deepened financial cooperation, including expanded renminbi-clearing infrastructure in London, commitments to promote cross-listingsthrough mechanisms such as the China-UK Stock Connect scheme, and institutional plumbing that shapes global capital flows while strengthening China’sglobalfinancial influence.

Ireland’s leadership traveled as well, while Australia sought stabilization after years ofintensetradefrictions, recriminations, andretaliation. India engaged Beijing at summit level despite enduring border tensionsalong the Himalayan frontier. Next up is Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz, whose visit carriesparticular weightgiven Germany’scentral rolein Europe’s industrial supply chainswith an automobile industry hanging on by a thread and losing global market share to Chinese rivals.

Taken individually, these trips are pragmatic exercises in economic statecraft. Viewed collectively, they reflect the growing agency of what Carney has described as the”middle powers”imperative torebalanceby thosestates large enough to shape global outcomesandunwilling to be trapped withinthegreat-power volatility. The promise of this hedging strategy lies in diversification, diplomatic optionality, and insulation from tariff shocks. Its peril lies inglobalfragmentation, weakened alliances, and a China that pockets newfound influence without offering openness or magnanimity in return.

Mistrust of China and a pivotal Munich meeting

As the Munich Security Conference begins, there are signs of tension involving both the U.S. and China. German Chancellor Merz said in his remarks on the first day of the conference on Friday that “the international order based on rights and rules is currently being destroyed,” but speaking in English he also said that the U.S. could not “go it alone” and described Americans as “friends.”

History does offer caution about an international realignment towards China. In 2017, Xi Jinping traveled to Davos and delivered a speechas feted andcelebrated asMark Carney’s, a robustdefense offree trade andglobalization in the face ofa protectionistTrump 1.0agenda. China was briefly cast as the alternativeanda safe haven, yet Beijingfailed tolive up to that promise, insteaditusheredin the era of wolf warrior diplomacy. It is entirelypossible Chinacould squander this moment as well.

Signs of friction with China are already visible. Reporting ahead of this year’sMunich Security Conferencehighlighted thestrained institutional relations between Brussels(EU institutions)and Beijing, including restricted diplomatic access, unresolved disputes over industrial overcapacity, and recriminations over China’s alignment with Russia.While 2026 has seen engagement at the bilateral level expanding,EU institutional mistrustof Chinapersists.

Munich therefore assumes outsized significance. Both Washington and Beijing will need to reassure bruised Europeans. Secretary of State Marco Rubio willlead the official U.S. delegation andbe underheavyscrutiny after Vance’s performance last year, while China must do more than offer rhetorical warmthfrom the podiumif it hopes to sustainthe 2026momentum.

Hovering over all of this is President Trump’santicipatedvisit to Beijing in early April, thejewel in the diplomatic visits’ crown for China. After hosting America’s allies, Xi Jinping will host the American president, reinforcing China’s narrative that global diplomacy still converges on Beijing. In Beijing’s telling, the Middle Kingdom is back.

Substance, however, will matter more than symbolism. Chinese officials have already signaled pressure on Taiwan arms sales. In prior administrations, including during my time in the Obama administration, such leverage ran into statutory guardrails under the Taiwan Relations Act, whichobligatesthe United States toprovideTaiwan defensive capabilities. Trump’s more discretionary approach complicates that dynamic.

If Beijing is articulating its asks, Washington should articulate its own, from clemency for Jimmy Lai tosubstantive and measurablecooperation on Ukraine.Engagementabsent reciprocity risks signaling that pressure yields access at minimal cost.

All ofthis underscores whythe geopoliticalrebalancing now underway extends far beyond diplomacy. The global system is not realigning wholesale toward China, but it is recalibrating as allies hedge and middle powers assert agencyand the U.S. pressure allies more than adversaries.History shows that the world has gone to China before, drawn by growth and a belief in endless opportunity, and then rapidly pulled back amid geopolitical tensions and shocks. Now it appears businesses are drifting back once more, cautiously, and pragmatically, compelled less by trust in China’s goodwill than by limited options and strategic necessity.

As that drift gathers momentum, it is reshaping the terrain in which global business must operate, influencing how firms re-enter China while hedging against overexposure, how they engage middle powers pursuing strategic optionality, and how they compete in third markets against Chinese companies now going global at scale. It is altering capital allocation across geopolitical spheres, forcing compliance recalibration, prompting yet another redesign of supply-chain architecture, and introducing a more complex form of dual-state risk exposure spanning both the U.S. and China. Businesses cannot afford to misread or misplay this inflection point or dismiss it as a temporary Trumpian phenomenon.True, he set this course in motion, but the geopolitical fault lines are likely to continue to shift and if fully materialized, this will be the big one.

—ByDewardric McNeal, managing director and senior policy analyst at Longview Global, and a CNBC contributor